UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

KAREEM BELLAMY, et al., * Case No. 12-CV-1025(AMD)

*

Plaintiffs, * Brooklyn, New York * January 22, 2021

V .

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CITY OF NEW YORK, et al.,

*

Defendants.

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TRANSCRIPT OF CIVIL CAUSE FOR MOTION HEARING
BEFORE THE HONORABLE PEGGY KUO
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

APPEARANCES:

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Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording, transcript produced by transcription service.

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1 me while I pull everything up so that I'm looking at the 2 appropriate documents before you get started. 3 (Pause.) 4 So why don't I start with the plaintiff and then you can tell me what you're attempting to accomplish here and then 5 I'll hear from Mr. Lax. Okay? 6 MR. MAAZEL: Thank you, Your Honor. This is Ilann 7 8 Maazel for the plaintiff. So we are here on a motion to amend filed by the 9 10 plaintiff. This is a motion to add a new Monell claim against 11 the City of New York. And the motion arises from discovery 12 that we engaged in in November and December of 2020. 13 So just to step back for a moment, we obviously have 14 a number -- Section 1983 claims against the individual 15 defendants and -- as well as Monell claims against the 16 defendant City. 17 What we learned that was new in the depositions in 18 November and December was important information that we felt 19 merited an additional claim. 20 So we already had a claim related to the summation 2.1 misconduct. We had a claim related to the witness protection 22 program. 23 But what we learned from Mr. Schwartz, the number 24 two in the Queens District Attorney's Office, and what we 25 learned from Mr. Castellano, the 30(b)(6) witness from the

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City, is that there were at least some 58 decisions from the Second Department and other courts before 1996 finding arranged prosecutorial misconduct in the office.

And we learned that the QDAO was aware of those decisions at the highest levels and we learned that they took no action to fix any of those problems. They changed no policy. They changed no procedure. They didn't discipline anyone. They didn't investigate. They didn't change their evaluations. They didn't change the way they supervised. They didn't change their hiring practices.

They had really a broad based deliberate indifference to prosecutorial misconduct in the office, including the very types of conduct that we are at issue in the Bellamy case, such as *Brady* violations and summation misconduct. So this was significant information to us.

Just as a matter of timing we in August of 2020 filed our 3(b)(6) notice with the City, or served our 30(b)(6) notice on the City, to discuss the City's response to that memo collecting information about prosecutorial misconduct in the office.

The City moved to quash part or all of the 30(b)(6) notice. We had a lot of back and forth with the City, both before we went to the court and then before the court. Your Honor allowed that 30(b)(6) notice to proceed and that deposition to proceed and we did. We then deposed Mr.

Castellano on behalf of the City.

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On December 1st, 2020 -- we received the transcript from that deposition on December 9th and within a few days we had drafted our amended -- or our proposed amended complaint, sent that to the City. Asked them whether they would consent to filing, they did not consent and that's what led to the premotion conference and now this motion.

I just want to make a couple of points on the law here. The first, of course, is as we all know leave to amend a complaint is liberally granted. That's the first point.

The second point is that there's really no prejudice at all to the City here. We're not adding any new defendant. We're not seeking any new discovery. We need no new discovery based on this claim.

This will not affect the expert discovery schedule, which is proceeding at pace. It will not affect the trial schedule. In fact, we reached an agreement with defense counsel to file the pretrial order sooner than we previously anticipated.

So there won't be any delay. There won't be any new defendant. And the City's papers state that they don't view this as a new claim.

And if that is true -- I don't agree with that, but if that is true, there's certainly no prejudice to the City for adding new information that simply supports the claims

that we have.

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So we would suggest that the motion to amend be granted. We cite a number of cases to the court. It's not unusual at all to amend pleadings at the end of discovery absent some significant prejudice to the defendant and we cited the *Keinig* (ph) case and the *Purdy* (ph) case and the *J.P. Morgan* case and a number of other cases.

Again, we believe that this is a motion supported by evidence we learned relatively recently. We worked as diligently and promptly as we could to propose an amended complaint based upon that testimony.

We provided that to the defense as soon as we possibly could, really within days of receiving the transcript of that second critical deposition, and there's no prejudice at all really to the City.

And so we would just ask that the motion be granted, that the claim be part of the case and we proceed pursuant to the existing schedule in the case, including the pretrial order and ultimately trial.

THE COURT: Can you explain what the necessity is for you to have this information in an amended complaint?

MR. MAAZEL: Sure. So the existing claims -- the existing *Monell* claims, one of them focuses on summation misconduct exclusively. The other focuses on the witness protection program exclusively. And those claims, of course,

were upheld by the Second Circuit.

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This claim is broader and it's based on the testimony we learned, which is that it wasn't simply that the City or really the QDAO was deliberately indifferent to submission of conduct. It wasn't simply that they had no policy procedure to share witness protection information with the (indiscernible) ADA or with the defense.

It was a broader deliberate indifference to prosecutorial misconduct in the office, the scope of which really exceeds what's in our other claims and the scope of which was unknown to the plaintiff. I mean, this was certainly known to the defense throughout the case but it was unknown to the plaintiff.

And so it's a claim that focuses not just on the more narrow issues of summation misconduct and the WPP program, but also on the overall deliberate indifference to prosecutorial misconduct in the office, which is important because that overall indifference to really all sorts of different types of misconduct was, we believe, a substantial factor or proximate cause of the decisions made by Mr. Guy in this case which led to Mr. Bellamy's conviction and imprisonment.

THE COURT: Okay. So I heard a couple of different things and I just want to get clarification. You said the new claim is -- you're saying the existing claim is deliberate

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indifference to summation and deliberate indifference to
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        witness protection procedures, right?
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                  MR. MAAZEL: Broadly speaking, yes.
                  THE COURT: Okay. A new thing that you're adding is
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        also deliberate indifference but to broader categories of
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        misconduct, not just summation and witness protection but
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        other things. You said all sorts prosecutorial misconduct.
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        Is that right?
                  MR. MAAZEL: That's correct, Your Honor.
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                  THE COURT: Okay. So it's still deliberate
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        indifference, but it's the area to which they're deliberately
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        indifferent go beyond summation of witness protection.
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                  MR. MAAZEL: That's true. Exactly.
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                  THE COURT: Okay. But how would you describe those
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        additional areas that they're deliberately indifferent to?
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                  MR. MAAZEL: Well, we cite a number of examples in
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        the complaint and it's -- I mean, it's every type of
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        prosecutorial misconduct -- well, not everything, but --
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                  THE COURT: I know, but I'm just trying to figure
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        out beyond summation and witness protection, what is it that
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        they're -- what's the misconduct that they're deliberately
        indifferent to. Not how, right, because you described how by
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        not disciplining and things like that --
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                  MR. MAAZEL: Sure.
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                  THE COURT: -- but what misconduct are you talking
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        about?
                 MR. MAAZEL: So the conduct included misconduct in
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        openings. Misconduct in cross examination. Rosario
       violations. I believe Molineux violations.
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                  THE COURT: I'm sorry. What?
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                  MR. MAAZEL: Molineux. Maybe I'm mispronouncing it.
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       M-O-L-I-N-E-U-X.
                  THE COURT: I don't know what that is.
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                  MR. MAAZEL: Those are violations to using prior
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        acts of -- when a prosecutor can and cannot use prior bad acts
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                  THE COURT: (indiscernible) the evidence.
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                  MR. MAAZEL: Yes. Roughly.
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                  So it's sort of wide ranging misconduct. And our
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       point is --
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                  THE COURT: Those are the categories you're talking
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        about?
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                  MR. MAAZEL: Those are some of them. I mean, I --
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                  THE COURT: I'd like to know the universe of it.
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                  MR. MAAZEL: All right. I'm just going through our
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       proposed --
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             (Pause.)
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                  So some of the examples we cited include -- you
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       know, do include summation misconduct. Do include Brady
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       violations. Also include disregarding court rulings. Limiting
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unfairly prejudicial evidence. Improper cross examination questions. I'm just going through some of the examples, Your Honor, and I don't think this was an exhaustive list because we didn't want to write every single example of them.

THE COURT: Well, you certainly came close to it because it's quite extensive so I -- it surprises me that you're saying you weren't being exhaustive.

MR. MAAZEL: We didn't, for example, list every one of the 58 plus cases. I think we listed --

THE COURT: At the trial you're going to bring all of this up? Because if you're alleging it, I assume you're trying to prove it, right? Usually you put things in a complaint because you're intending to prove it.

MR. MAAZEL: Sure.

THE COURT: So you're going to prove all of these things. That's your intention.

MR. MAAZEL: Well, there's no dispute about these violations. These are all holdings by --

THE COURT: Okay. So then why do they need to be in the complaint? I'm just very confused about what you're trying to do here which is why I opened by asking you what you're trying to achieve.

MR. MAAZEL: What we would like to show the jury, demonstrate to the jury, is that there was a wide range of known prosecutorial misconduct within the office, known at the

highest levels of the office, A. And B, deliberate indifference to that misconduct. And --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MAAZEL: And various (indiscernible).

THE COURT: Yes. And so the deliberate indifference you've already pled and you've been doing extensive discovery on that and it's with regard to the things that actually happened — that you've alleged happened in this case with regard to Mr. Bellamy, which led to a wrongful conviction and violation of his civil rights, or his constitutional rights with the summation of the witness protection and — you mentioned *Brady*.

I don't know if it fits into those but I'll just -why don't I just say *Brady* as a separate category. Okay. So
three things are already in the complaint and you've been
doing a lot of discovery in that area, which is why I
permitted in your recitation of what's being asked for I
permitted that discovery.

So the question for me now is -- there are a couple of different questions. One is the list of things that you said are additional, prosecutorial misconduct, opening statements, cross examination, prior acts, disregard of court rulings, don't appear to be things that you alleged happened in Mr. Bellamy's case, correct?

MR. MAAZEL: That's true. Some of those things did

not happen in this case. That's correct.

THE COURT: Well, none of those, because you didn't plead it originally. And I assumed that you've scoured the record in his trial and if any of these happened, you would have brought it up.

So if you didn't bring it up, I'm assuming that those things did not happen at his trial, correct?

MR. MAAZEL: Our claims about what happened in the Bellamy case specifically are not different by (indiscernible).

THE COURT: Right. And so if you're going to say that the Queens D.A.'s Office was a total miss and they're disregarding all kinds of prosecutorial misconduct, examples of which affected your client's case, you already are in a position to do that because you can argue what happened in your client's case and you can argue the *Monell* part, which is the background, which is that the office didn't do anything that could have helped your client avoid these problems.

And so to bring in all this other information into the complaint I am just very confused as to how the trial is going to happen when the jury has to read this extensive complaint, because that's what they'll have to do as part of their deliberations, and go through it say basically what the heck. What are we deciding here? I thought this trial was about Mr. Kareem Bellamy.

And I just don't know what is accomplished either for your client or for your case by adding all this distracting, perhaps -- well, I will say unnecessary detail to the complaint. And that's why I asked you because I thought I might be missing something.

Why does this need to be in a complaint? Why can't it just be part of the case that you may be able to present, if Judge Donnelly allows it, to support your existing Monell claims, which are already quite broad and specifically talk about Kareem Bellamy's trial. And some of it could be -- you know, there's stipulations that certain things happened. And that's it. And you could present your case that way. Am I missing something?

MR. MAAZEL: Well, adding this claim will ensure that the jury hears the full sweep and scope of the deliberate indifference of this office. And --

THE COURT: But I assume they're going to hear that anyway because you've got all this information. And if you could convince Judge Donnelly that you should be able to present this information to support the claim about the *Monell* claim about the deliberate indifference for the prosecutorial misconduct that occurred in your client's case, then you get to present what you need to to prove your case.

MR. MAAZEL: My point, Your Honor, is simply that there's different types of misconduct engaged on a systemic

basis by the office that led to the breakdowns that occurred in Mr. Bellamy's case.

And they're not all the same. There are different ways — there are different practices of the office, there's different policies to the office that led to this wrongful conviction. And we're already pled two of them. But they aren't the only practices, policies and customs that led to what happened here.

And certainly we're entitled, I believe, to plead more than one *Monell* claim in a given case. And here there is a broader policy/practice in the office that was a proximate cause of the constitutional violations in this case and --

THE COURT: Well, if that's the case, why wouldn't it be enough for you just to amend it to say summation, witness protection, Brady and other types such as opening statements, cross examination, (indiscernible), disregard of court ruling?

MR. MAAZEL: In short, just add all of those allegations to the existing claims as opposed to a new claim?

THE COURT: So the complaint -- it's a document of allegations. I'm just asking -- I haven't heard from Mr. Lax yet, right, so I'll hear from him, but I'm just -- there's a lot of detail here.

And that's the question -- that's really the heart of my question is why are you throwing all of this detail into

this document that's basically a pleading document?

MR. MAAZEL: Sure, and it's -- you know, it is a long complaint. It's certainly not the longest complaint I've seen. But that reflects the sweeping nature of the allegations.

THE COURT: Yeah, but this case -- this is what -- I know Judge Donnelly has expressed her concern on the record as to where this trial is going because it feels like Mr. Kareem Bellamy is getting lost in all of this. That the case gets broader and broader and becomes a bigger and bigger indictment of the system, of the office of the -- whatever it is and that may play a role in what happened to him.

But really the heart of the matter is what happened to him and the heart of the trial should be focused on what happened to him.

And so there's just a real concern that the more that gets thrown into the pleadings, the more the trial is going to spin away from this human being at the heart of the case.

This is just my question and, of course, like I said, I will ask Mr. Lax to jump in and I'll hear what he has to say.

But I wanted to understand from you what the reason was that you're making this request because I didn't see it upon review of what you've given me and I thought that I might

be missing something. So let me hear if you have anything else to say before I turn to Mr. Lax.

MR. MAAZEL: I would just say that I don't see addition of this claim really expanding the length of the trial in any remotely substantial way.

I mean, I think it's quite likely that the 30(b)(6) witness will be a witness at trial. Quite likely that Barry Schwartz, the number two in the office, will be a witness at the trial and testifying about various claims in the case.

So there will be very efficient ways for us to present this evidence to the jury and we certainly feel it's in Mr. Bellamy's best interest for the jury to hear the evidence supporting this *Monell* claim, which ultimately is a claim that will -- if he prevails will provide him relief.

So we strongly believe that this does help Mr. Bellamy's case and it is important to Mr. Bellamy's case and it is relevant to the jury's deliberations.

MR. RUDIN: Your Honor, this is Joel Rudin. Might I add something?

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. RUDIN: The existing complaint does not as explicitly as would be desirable allege that a failure to discipline *Brady* violations generally led to the *Brady* violation that occurred in this case.

And we made an effort before Judge Donnelly decided

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the motion to -- for summary judgment or as to the *Monell* claim to dismiss to make it clear that that was the plaintiff's theory.

And we conducted a great deal of discovery on that theory but the complaint hasn't been amended to make crystal clear that even though the Second Circuit noted that that theory is being pursued by plaintiff it's not clearly within the four corners of the complaint.

And in addition to that the -- you know the Supreme Court has made clear in *Conick v. Thompson* and the circuit courts have made clear that you don't have to have exactly the same constitutional violation to give notice to the municipality that there's a defective policy or practice and to establish a claim of deliberate indifference.

And essentially the courts have upheld the theory that the failure to discipline or to take remedial measures against misconduct generally will create a winning at all cost atmosphere that will lead to the kind of specific violations that occurred in a particulars case.

So that part of what this amendment accomplishes is to make clear that he large number of misconduct cases that are collected in that 1996 memorandum and the indifference of the office in various different ways to their knowledge about that misconduct created an atmospheres and a policy — and shows that there was a policy of deliberate of indifferent

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that existing at the time of the Bellamy trial that led David Guy to commit the specific acts of misconduct that he committed.

He might have committed other acts of misconduct. These happen to be the ones that he committed in this case because all he cared about was winning and he knew there'd be no consequence to him if he committed the *Brady* violation, if he committed the summation misconduct.

And so I understand Your Honor has raised the question about whether or not this amendment is too detailed. I think the reason for it is that the testimony that we received that Mr. Mazel elicited very recently is very, very dramatic.

Here you have a report that the highest levels of the office asked for that documented this misconduct that he had been found by the appellant courts in New York over, and over, and over again from the late 1980's until 1995 and at the beginning of 1996. They're obviously aware of the misconduct and now it's all collected for them and they do nothing. They don't change any of their practices or policies.

And so that -- one can infer from that indifference that the same atmospheres and policy and deliberate indifference existed around the time of the Bellamy trial and it's broader than holding back \$2,800 of undisclosed benefits,

or whatever the amount is that this witness was promised. And it's broader than the exact acts of summation misconduct that happened to occur in this case.

And so I think that's the reason why we would like to have the complaint be clearer so that the City cannot come back at the time of trial and say well, the existing complaint from 2012, if it's still the operative complaint, doesn't say anything about the failure to discipline *Brady* violations and it doesn't explicitly say that there was an atmosphere — a winning at all cost atmosphere that was created by the failure to take any steps against any prosecutorial misconduct resulting in violations of the constitutional rights of criminal defendants.

So I think it's important for us to be able to have a document that makes clear what our theory is and so there isn't a problem at trial where the City can raise an argument that certain proof should not be allowed because the operative complaint doesn't make crystal clear that it's part of our theory.

THE COURT: And where in your amendment, or proposed amendment, do you make it crystal clear?

MR. RUDIN: Well, the --

THE COURT: In the hundred paragraphs that you're proposing to add, where does this become crystal clear?

MR. RUDIN: In the amended complaint that is added - $\,$

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        - in the cause of action that's added to the complaint that is
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        around -- I mean, is built around the testimony about the --
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                  THE COURT: Tell me which paragraph so I can read
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        it.
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                  MR. RUDIN: I don't have it. Maybe Mr. Maazel can
        do it. I don't have it in front of me but it alleges that
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        there was widespread prosecutorial misconduct --
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                  THE COURT: I know. I'm sorry, Mr. Rudin. I know
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        that's what you're saying but I'm looking for the crystal
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        clear argument, the crystal clear statement of your expanded
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        theory.
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                  You propose adding a hundred paragraphs to your
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        complaint and so I'm asking you to point me to where it is.
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                  MR. RUDIN: Well, I don't --
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                  MR. MAAZEL: I have it in front of me, Your Honor.
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        And of course it really is throughout the claim. But if we
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        were to pick --
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                  THE COURT: Yeah, but this is the problem, right?
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        You're saying crystal clear but it's not crystal clear because
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        it's lost.
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                  MR. MAAZEL: Well, I --
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                  THE COURT: Before you do that, because you might
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        need a moment, I'm looking to see whether the Brady violation
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        is alleged. I had the sense that the Brady violation was
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        alleged -- it certainly was alleged in a way that was clear
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        enough for the Second Circuit, as you pointed out, to say that
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        you had alleged it.
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                  So I'm looking to see again through your red line
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        where it is that you've now added a clear reference to the
        Brady violation issue.
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                  MR. MAAZEL: If I could start with Your Honor's
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        first question. So I think if you just start with paragraph
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        405. And so this is a straight forward paragraph that makes
        clear the breadth of the deliberate indifference here.
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                  THE COURT: So paragraph 405 is the one where you
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        say the City admitted certain things in the 30(b)(6)
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        deposition.
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                  MR. MAAZEL: Yes. That's right. That the City --
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                  THE COURT: That is a -- okay. Hold on a second.
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        This is in your statement of facts. This is not in a claim.
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                  MR. MAAZEL: No, this is in the claim.
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                  THE COURT: Okay. I'm sorry. I'm looking to see
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        where. Claim to Monell, the policy and practice, custom of
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        prosecutorial misconduct, right?
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                  MR. MAAZEL: Yes.
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                  THE COURT: Claim two. Yes. Okay.
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                  And so you're saying paragraph 407 recites certain
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        facts.
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MR. MAAZEL: Paragraph 405.

THE COURT: 405. Yes.

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MR. MAAZEL: So paragraph 405 lists in simple terms what we learned in the 30(b)(6) deposition.

THE COURT: Right. Those are the failed to take certain actions.

MR. MAAZEL: Yes.

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THE COURT: Okay. And then where's the expanded -you said that the original complaint said summation
violations, witness protection issues and *Brady*. And now you
want to add and other misconduct but the 405 doesn't contain
misconduct. 405 contains a list of failures to act.

MR. RUDIN: Your Honor, paragraph 397 does it very clearly.

Extensive history. These individuals have extensive history of prosecutorial misconduct. I'm sorry. The office

THE COURT: 397. Okay. Let me take a look at 397.

had prosecutorial misconduct. Okay.

MR. RUDIN: And then it's followed by 398.

THE COURT: Okay. So it strikes me that -- and it struck me while I was reading this that you, as Mr. Rudin said, have this very dramatic report and you want to make sure the jury hears of the content.

Are you saying that without the amendment you wouldn't be able to introduce the report to the jury?

MR. MAAZEL: We would certainly -- if we were stuck with our existing complaint, we would make every argument we

could do before the jury.

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But having this claim would make plain that it should be before the jury.

THE COURT: Well, but maybe you don't have to go that far. Have you tried to see if you could stipulate to portions of the complaint, or the introduction of information in the report?

If that's your goal, again, going back to my original question, if your goal is to put this very dramatic report before the jury, is there another way to do it other than amending the complaint with a hundred new paragraphs?

MR. MAAZEL: Well, we have twin goals, Your Honor.

One is to make sure the evidence is before the jury and the second is to make sure the claim is before the jury; it's own separate claim, because this is an important claim that if we prevail will vindicate Mr. Bellamy's rights.

THE COURT: Yes. Okay. All right. Mr. Lax, you've been waiting patiently. Let me hear from you.

MR. RUDIN: Your Honor, paragraph 4 --

THE COURT: I'm sorry. Somebody was speaking. I can't --

MR. RUDIN: Paragraph 401 makes the causation very clear between the types of misconduct that we would like to have in the case, clearly in the case, and the causation of constitutional violations that occurred in this case. The

link has made very clear.

The rest of it is detail that we would like in the complaint but at the very least we need to have clear the theories under which the evidence would be admissible.

Otherwise no doubt the City's going to try to drastically limit our proof to the 2012 complaint which is not a model of draftsmanship.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Lax?

MR. LAX: Thank you, Your Honor.

I'll note first of all going back to the operative complaint, these dramatic statements that they're now pointing to paragraph 401, 397 in their revised proposed complaint, the basic premises are all in their operative pleading and, frankly, we have been doing discovery about all of this.

Like I'm not -- all of the things that Mr. Rudin and Mr. Maazel are saying about the nature of their complaints,

I've not heard anything surprising because I knew that one,

they were going to suggest -- I knew based on -- taking

everything, the entire record altogether that they were going

to be alleging deliberate indifference.

And I was aware that they were going to say that not just in summation, or with *Brady* but with everything there wasn't sufficient training, because that's the way they took the depositions and that's the way they prosecuted discovery in this case. All of that happened and it's been clear.

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So this idea that they now suddenly need to add a hundred or whatever paragraphs to the complaint to make things clear, it's just simply not true. It's all there.

And I think what crystalizes the point is that when this case went up on appeal after summary judgment was granted by the district court, Mr. Rudin put in his brief a description of what the *Monell* claim was. And I'll read it if the court would like me to. It's on page 47 to 48.

And it says, "Beyond challenging the so called Chinese wall policy, Bellamy alleges that the *Brady* violation and summation misconduct in this case also resulted from the longstanding deliberate indifference of the D.A. as the personnel manager of his office through rampant and constitutional violations, proven not only by the existence and persistence of the Chinese wall," which is in quotation marks," policy but also by the failure of the D.A. to properly train and supervise and discipline the offending prosecutor."

The complaint alleges that 65 appellate decisions were issued condemning such misconduct in the tenured proceeding of the Bellamy trial and that a further 72 decisions were issued through 2012 when the complaint was filed. Yet none of the responsible prosecutors were disciplined.

So previously before this amendment was requested plaintiff was quite clear that all of this was in the

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operative pleadings. And so now the argument's being advanced that somehow it's sufficing.

It's not sufficient. This amendment falls squarely within the cases that say that once you have a clear and concise statement of what your claim is about, amending to embellish and embroider details of things that are really meant for the jury is impermissible.

And I think that that point is borne out by our discussion because when one considers plaintiff's arguments this afternoon and what they really were talking about, is they were really talking about relevance issues as it relates to evidence.

There is no allegation that I'm aware of either through the course of discovery and my (indiscernible) in this case or by the proposed amendment that a new theory of underlying constitutional misconduct occurred, be it an improper opening, and improper cross examination. Improper misuse of Molineux, or disregarding Molineux rulings, or (indiscernible).

None of that is -- (indiscernible). So all this is

I think is a pitch to get some of this in front of the jury.

The case law is clear though that this is not the forum or the context with which one does it.

And then putting us through the burden of sifting threw all this discovery to respond to this complaint has been

found to be prejudicial.

We then now -- I mean, there's just a generalized prosecutorial misconduct delivered in different claims being thrown out there. That is going to be subject to further motion practice.

I mean, it does expand the work on the case and it doesn't really add anything because there are really motion sin limine issues about whether, you know, a decision by the Second Department of the State of New York in X year is evidence of like the improper training when X prosecutor violated the New York State standard for G type of conduct.

I mean, that's the -- those are evidence questions.

They're not necessarily a pleading question.

I mean, I'll say just generally I don't agree with all the representations that have been made about the (indiscernible) but I don't think that's really germain to our discussion here today.

So I think the court has a right, and the court's initial inclination that (indiscernible) are necessary is correct because it is. It doesn't add anything in terms of just inflammatory discussions about the D.A.'s office which whatever the motive is, it's just, again, it relates to evidence not claims.

THE COURT: All right. So thank you, everybody for your input.

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MR. RUDIN: Your Honor, may I add one thing in reply.

THE COURT: Who's speaking, please?

MR. RUDIN: Mr. Rudin. Joel Rudin.

THE COURT: Yes. Go ahead.

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MR. RUDIN: The problem -- I mean -- as Mr. Lax pointed out I handled the Second Circuit appeal and we pointed out in a footnote that while we had made it clear to the district court that we were pursuing a claim of the failure to discipline Brady violations, and that was part of our theory and we argued it that way, and the Second Circuit noted that that theory was -- that was one of our claims, if one looks at the way the complaint is drafted, while there are factual allegations in the factual part of the complaint that talk about training and discipline generally for misconduct, the way the actual causes of actions are drafted is you have one cause of action that is entitled failure to discipline summation misconduct, and then there's another cause of action that's entitled witness protection -- that makes reference to the deficient witness protection program.

But the broader theory that Mr. Lax seems to be conceding is in the case, and I'm glad that he's conceding that it's in the case and he's understood it all along, it still isn't spelled out in our complaint as clearly as we would like it to be so that there isn't any question going

forward.

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And the paragraphs that I referred Your Honor to earlier are -- stand alone without the factual material that is in the proposed amendment and make it clear what Mr. Lax is saying is in the case, but which is not as clearly stated in the operative complaint as it might.

And so while I think it's important -- we, of course, would like the factual material that's in the proposed amendment to be allowed, at the very least we would ask that the paragraphs that make the legal theory clearer, and which Mr. Lax concedes is not a surprise to him at all be permitted.

MR. LAX: Your Honor, if I could have one very final brief point?

THE COURT: All Right.

MR. LAX: It's simply this. That we seem to have broad agreement on this call and on this hearing that there is no surprise to the City.

And I would suggest that under the unanimous case law, when there's no surprise to the City there's really no basis to oppose amending the complaint.

We all apparently seem to understand what the basic claims are and what the basic facts are and we are supposed to be the masters of our own complaint as to plaintiff and we believe that this is important to add as a claim.

And since there's really no dispute that there's no

prejudice here at all to the defense we would suggest that leave be liberally granted to amend and we just proceed under the new complaint.

THE COURT: I heard Mr. Lax say there is prejudice to the defendant in having to respond to file an answer to a complaint like this.

And even though your theory as you've described it and summarized it may not be a surprise to anybody and sure, in the first instance you can file a complaint as you wish, a complaint or an amendment, a proposed amendment like this does start to look like you're skirting any ability of the trial judge to rule on motions in limine on each of these points to weigh whether, in fact, it's fact relevant or not.

And so it's not as simple as you've set out to say that there's a -- whatever you want to do with the complaint you should be allowed to as along as it doesn't hurt -- as long as it's no surprise to the defendant, I simply don't accept that.

So I know the parties need to move forward on this and so I'm prepared to rule on your proposed amendments and I will start with what you've said, Mr. Maazel, about leave to amend should be granted (indiscernible).

And so I've looked at your proposed amendment in that light and I've looked at the timing of this, as well as the prejudice to the defendant.

I don't find that the amendments are proper. They are not of the kind of information or allegations that belong in a complaint. They are more — they are so detailed they really are an attempt to make the complaint evidence itself.

And so I don't -- I just don't see the utility of permitting this complaint and I do find that there's prejudice because now that the defendant, as they should any time there's a pleading, needs to answer each argument -- each allegation that's presented and then figure out how to respond to it legally as well as factually.

Now you may say, Mr. Maazel, well, this is evidence that the defendants know about so what's there to deny? They should just admit everything.

But this is also a document that's going to be the document that the jurors will be using to make their decision and this goes far beyond placing allegations for the jury to consider in terms of making their decision. So I don't think it's proper.

And then the last point is that as unhappy as you may feel about the original complaint and Mr. Rudin's characterization of it, as inartfully pled, it contains everything you need in terms of the allegations.

And if there's anything beyond that that you want to present to Judge Donnelly, you can certainly bring it up to her and have her decide what is relevant to this case and what

isn't.

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And if at that point you look back on this and say well, if Judge Kuo hasn't let us amend, then we would be talking differently in terms of what this trial would look like. You could ask her to reconsider my ruling today.

But I think at this late game -- this late stage of the game and having had everybody move forward, including me, on the assumption or the understanding that these were exactly the issues that you were looking at, the amendments are both unnecessary and prejudicial.

So the motion to amend is denied, except to the extent that you've now fixed some of the -- deleted some of the causes of action that were with the -- the motion for summary judgment was upheld by the Second Circuit.

So I think it would be very useful for everybody to use the clean copy of the amended complaint that only reflects the amendment insofar as it takes out what has been dismissed in the case.

So please go back and take a look at what that is and that's the amended complaint. I'll permit that amendment to go forward so the jury is looking at a clean document.

All right. Anything else, Mr. Maazel?

MR. MAAZEL: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Lax?

MR. LAX: No, Your Honor.

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                  THE COURT: All right. Thank you, everybody.
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                  MR. MAAZEL: Thank you, Judge.
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             (Proceedings concluded at 2:07 p.m.)
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        I, CHRISTINE FIORE, Certified Electronic Reporter and
        Transcriber, certify that the foregoing is a correct
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        transcript from the official electronic sound recording of the
        proceedings in the above-entitled matter.
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                Christine Fiore
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           Christine Fiore, CERT
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